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ABSTRACT 
Win Shares & Rookie Contracts in the NBA 
 
Lucas R. Kobat 
Director: Mike Allgrunn, Ph.D. 
This paper examines the relationship between the win share statistic and 
compensation in the National Basketball Association (NBA) by using data from eighteen 
draft classes from 1989 to 2006. The research shows that players are generally 
compensated in accordance with their production, unless bound by a rookie contract. 
Historically, players under a rookie contract have win share production that exceeds their 
compensation level. Therefore, in-game statistics are examined, using both collegiate and 
NBA data to determine whether win share production can be predicted before a player 
enters the NBA. Collegiate data does not prove to be a sound indicator of professional 
level win-shares, but in-game statistics do seem to be a good predictor of win-shares 
when NBA data is used. Ultimately, win share regression is beneficial for NBA 
organizations making rookie contract decisions (i.e. team options) for players that have 
been drafted, but further research would be needed to determine which players to draft.  
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Preface 
 
 
This paper seeks to use regression analysis and other statistical methods to 
understand the relationship between the individual contribution of players in the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) and their compensation. Ultimately, the research aims to 
develop a methodology for rookie contract decisions. Organizations take risk when they 
draft players, and risk/reward analysis must be completed to assess whether or not it is 
beneficial for organizations to exercise team options and continue to compensate prior 
draft selections.   
NBA organizations, at the end of the day, are firms that care about profit margins. 
While much of the literature attempts to capture marginal revenue per player through 
various methods, this research discusses individual player contribution as it relates to 
wins, disregarding intangible factors that may indirectly impact team revenues, such as 
personal brand. Forecasting brand affinity for a particular player is less reliable due to 
myriad variables that lie outside the realm of basketball, whereas win contribution is a 
direct impact to the success or failure of a player’s respective team.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
Introduction 
 
 
A Brief Argument For the Importance of Wins 
 
The research in this paper hinges on the assumption that additional wins are the 
most economically beneficial variable to organizations in the NBA. Therefore, additional 
wins will be viewed as the root cause of success for NBA teams. Essentially, more 
regular season wins result in an increased chance of winning an NBA championship; 
increasing team monetary value.  
Over the time period of 1989 to 2006, teams that either had the most wins in the 
Eastern Conference or Western Conference won the NBA championship 56% of the time. 
For championship winners, the average number of wins over this time period was sixty. 
Sixty wins equates to roughly 73% of games played in a regular season, as every team 
plays eighty-two games each year. Since teams need to win 73% of their regular season 
games to win an NBA championship, wins seem to be highly important to team success.  
Why do teams care about winning championships? The impact of championships on both 
short-term and long-term growth of team monetary value is substantial and shows why 
teams should care about winning the NBA championship. For example, the winner of the 
NBA championship in 2017 was the Golden State Warriors. Their current value is $2.6 
billion, but the important statistic to note is the 37% one-year growth they experienced 
after winning the championship. In fact, this growth rate was 1.31 times more than the 
second highest growth rate at 16%. This short-term growth is not atypical of NBA 
	 4	
champions. The Cleveland Cavaliers, after winning their first championship in franchise 
history, grew their team monetary value by 78% from $515 million in 2014 to $915 
million in 2015.  
Long-term growth also accompanies teams that are perennially successful in the 
post-season. As of 2017, four of the top five most valuable teams were also in the group 
of five teams with the most championships wins. In fact, the New York Knicks were the 
only team to be in the top five most valuable, but not the top five most championship 
wins. However, if NBA championship appearances were used in lieu of championship 
wins, all top five most valuable teams would also be in the group of five teams with most 
NBA finals appearances.  
As has been stated, regular season wins are a strong determinant of both NBA 
championship winners and teams that make the NBA finals. Additionally, teams that win 
the NBA championship experience a substantial short-term growth in monetary value, 
and teams that have historically been successful in the post-season experience long-term 
growth in monetary value. Therefore, NBA organizations should be interested in finding 
players that positively impact their yearly win total. To maximize their probability of 
growing monetary value, NBA teams should not only locate players with positive win 
contributions, but also players that do not carry a heavy payroll expense.  
This paper sought to find players with positive win contributions and minimal payroll 
burdens. Finally, the research aimed to create a comprehensive methodology for 
predicting win contribution levels both pre-draft and post-draft, which can aide NBA 
organizations in rookie contract decisions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
Dr. Thaler & Dr. Massey – The NFL Draft  
 
The inspiration for this research was largely based on the work of Dr. Richard 
Thaler of the University of Chicago and Dr. Cade Massey of the University of 
Pennsylvania. The work of Dr. Thaler and Dr. Massey involved studying the efficient 
market hypothesis in the National Football League (NFL).  
The duo used their data set to examine value of NFL players over their career. 
They used certain variables to capture “value” including the amount of starts, Pro Bowl 
selections, and yearly compensation. Player positions were also used in the performance 
evaluation (Massey & Thaler, 2013). 
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Figure 1 illustrates value per season for all player positions measured in millions 
of US dollars:  
Figure 1 - Massey & Thaler Value Per Season
 
 Clearly, quarterbacks are more valuable in the NFL marketplace than other 
positions, and increasingly more so as they become more successful. For example, a 
quarterback who starts fourteen or more games in one season is worth roughly $8 million 
dollars. However, if that quarterback is also “All pro”, their value jumps to just shy of 
$14 million dollars, which is roughly a 75% increase. 
 This examination of value is precisely the research this paper seeks to conduct, 
but through win contribution levels, taking the above method a step further by examining 
individual performance and the correlation to team wins generated. This expansion of the 
work done by Dr. Massey and Dr. Thaler allows for varying monetary values to be 
assigned to players according to their predicted win contribution.  
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An Explanation of Win Shares 
 
 Basketball is a fluid, fast-paced game with five individuals executing a variety of 
tasks simultaneously to produce the end product of points. This paper seeks to assign 
win-contribution levels to individual players. The concept of individual win-contribution 
is not completely new, and several sports sabermetricians have developed their own 
models. 
 The first to ever develop a win-contribution, or win share, model was Bill James. 
James, who currently works for the Boston Red Sox as Senior Baseball Operations 
Advisor, began his work on advanced baseball statistics in the 1970’s. Known as the 
pioneer of the sabermetric field, James became better known for The Bill James Baseball 
Abstract, in which he discussed the concept of win shares, along with many other ways of 
modeling Major League Baseball performance. His model assigns three win shares to 
every team per one win they produce, most likely to make the results easier to 
comprehend as most players (at least in the NBA) have sub-one win shares per season. 
The model works on an individual level as well as a team level. This paper is interested in 
win shares produced at the individual level, but for example purposes the model will be 
examined at the team level.  
 The Chicago Cubs in 2004 won 89 games. For Bill James’ model to be accurate, 
the output should roughly equate to 89 games. The underlying mathematics of the model 
deal with marginal runs scored and marginal runs saved. The margin is defined as half of 
the league average runs scored and half the league runs allowed by batters and pitchers 
respectively. To calculate marginal runs scored for the Cubs, one must take the league 
margin in 2004 of 376 runs scored and subtract it from the runs scored by Chicago (789). 
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Then take the difference of the league margin in 2004 for runs allowed (1127) and runs 
allowed by Chicago (665). Both of these calculations work out to 413 hitting runs and 
462 pitching runs. The combination of these figures equals 875 marginal runs for the 
Chicago Cubs in 2004. The 875 marginal runs are divided by twice the amount of league 
average runs in 2004 (1502), which produces an expected win-percentage of 58.2% or 94 
wins. Since the 2004 Chicago Cubs won 89 games, the error is 1.05%.  
The Sports-Reference Model 
 
Workers at Sports-Reference.com, who focus on compiling data for professional 
and collegiate sports leagues, developed the win-share model used for this research. The 
model is specific to the NBA and deviates from the model developed by Bill James in 
two ways. First, it sets one win share equal to one team win, whereas Bill James’ model 
set one win equal to three win shares. Second, the Sports-Reference model allows for 
negative win shares, which was avoided in Bill James’ model with the lowest possible 
win share figure being zero. These two key distinctions improve the win share model by 
allowing direct comparisons of win contribution levels of individuals on a given roster 
and the team’s win total. It also more realistically captures the notion that a player’s 
performance could indeed hurt team performance to the extent that his win-contribution 
inhibits the win shares generated by his teammates. 
Other NBA Prediction Models 
 
 This paper recognizes the magnitude of importance for the topic it examines, as 
the NBA is comprised of billion dollar organizations that have million dollar payrolls. 
Therefore, this research is not a final solution to predicting NBA player performance. 
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However, it does differentiate itself by taking a more focused approach in addressing the 
team option dilemma found within rookie contracts.  
FiveThirtyEight’s CARMELO 
 
 Most recently, writers at statistics publication FiveThirtyEight attempted to create 
a career projection tool named CARMELO. This model took player ratings like true 
shooting percentage and plus/minus scores, along with WAR (wins above replacement) 
to find similar historical players to the player being analyzed. Then, using the historical 
data of players most similar to the player in question, a ranged projected performance 
was calculated for statistics of interest like minutes played and WAR.  
 While the depth of the study is interesting, the breadth is limited with CARMELO 
ratings available solely for players who played at least 100 minutes in the 2014-2015 
season or at least 250 minutes in the 2013-2014 season. In contrast, the research for this 
paper culminated statistics spanning eighteen draft classes from 1989 to 2006. 
 In terms of predicting win production, the CARMELO model only projects a 
ranged WAR based on similar players. First, WAR is valuable as a comparison tool, but 
not as an absolute figure. The statistic cannot cleanly be converted into actual wins; 
therefore it is not helpful in discerning individual win contribution. While WAR may be 
helpful when making certain roster decisions, win shares are most useful when 
attempting to predict win production levels because the statistic is tied to actual win 
results and not an arbitrary baseline.  
 Finally, as stated by the developers of the model, there is bias in the simulation as 
CARMELO favors certain players and does not have adequate data to compare others, 
such as Golden State Warriors standout Steph Curry. Curry’s style of play is so unique 
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that historical comparisons are merely a poor man’s version of his performance, thus 
underweighting career projections (Silver & Paine, 2015). 
Coates & Oguntimein Model 
  
 Coates & Oguntimein examined the effects of college statistics on NBA draft 
position. Their paper, published in the North American Association of Sports Economists, 
specifically looked at in-game collegiate statistics and whether the player was in a big or 
small conference during college. The duo then looked at the correlation between college 
performance and NBA performance at the career level and bifurcated the data by big and 
small conference players.  
 Their paper found that college statistics can be an indicator of NBA career 
success and that NBA organizations tend to commit more to early picks than late picks, 
which is possibly due to “escalation of commitment” bias. This discovery is important 
insight into team decisions regarding rookie contracts because it shows that players 
drafted earlier may receive undeserved contract extensions. For example, Kwame Brown 
(considered one of the major busts in draft history) kept his spot on the Washington 
Wizards roster for the first four years of his career. However, Coates & Oguntimein do 
not evaluate production at the individual level, nor do they examine whether NBA teams 
could solve the escalation of commitment issue by attempting to predict win share levels 
for team option years of the rookie contract (Coates & Oguntimein, 2008). 
Greene’s PER & Win Share Analysis 
 
 Alexander Greene, while conducting graduate research at St. Cloud State, 
published a paper quite similar to the research found in this thesis. Greene examined the 
effect of college statistics on draft position and rookie statistics on career performance. 
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The research focused on PER (Player Efficiency Rating) and win shares as end points of 
the study. As noted in Greene’s paper, PER is not the most well rounded statistic, as it 
does not concretely attribute wins to individual players. Greene concluded that college 
statistics were good indicators of draft position and that rookie PER and rookie win 
shares were sound indicators of career performance.  
 Greene also used a similar data set, incorporating draft classes from 1985 to 2005 
so that players drafted in the latter portion of the data set would have full career 
observations. Whether or not drafts pre-1989 should be intermingled with drafts post-
1989 is a possible discussion point as 1989 was the implementation year for the modern 
draft lottery system. Additionally, Greene does not examine the nuance of the rookie 
contract and the team options that occur in years three and four. While taking similar 
initial steps, Greene’s “The Success of NBA Draft Picks: Can College Careers Predict 
NBA Winners?” does not extend to the decision point faced by NBA organizations, 
which is simply whether or not a player should be kept after the second year of his rookie 
contract (Greene, 2015).  
The NBA Draft 
NBA Draft 
 
The NBA draft dates back to 1947. The event encompasses the selection of 
college and foreign prospects by NBA franchises. Considerable amounts of resources are 
allocated to scouting incoming talent during their college or foreign careers. The modern 
NBA draft began in 1989 and reformed the process to include two rounds with a fixed 
draft order. NBA teams have the opportunity to add new talent to their respective rosters 
through the draft, which is one of only three opportunities to accomplish such a feat. The 
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other two opportunities are through trades and free agency, both of which are more 
capital intensive than the draft (NBA Draft Rules, 2017). 
NBA Draft Lottery 
 
 The first fourteen picks of the NBA draft are referred to as the lottery. Rights to 
draft at these positions are determined by a weighted Ping-Pong ball selection. 
Methodology relating to the amount of the weights and selection process has varied over 
time, but the framework has been consistent. Whichever team recorded the worst record 
the previous season is given the greatest weight in the lottery (currently measured by the 
count of Ping-Pong balls in the selection pool). The earliest versions of the draft lottery 
originate in 1985 with the modern system being implemented for the 1989-1990 season. 
The importance of the draft lottery is seen in trade behavior by NBA front offices that 
regularly attempt to “move up” into the lottery section of the draft in order to acquire 
better talent compared to the talent available in the remaining pool of players (Dengate, 
2005). 
NBA Rookie Contracts 
 
Rookie contracts are two years in length, with a team-based option for a third year 
that may be exercised at the end of a player’s rookie season until the following October 
31st. If the team exercises their option for a third year, they are also entitled to an option 
for a fourth year. This option may be exercised from the completion of a player’s second 
season to the following October 31st. Following the potential four years of a rookie 
contract, teams may extend qualifying offers to rookies, who at this point are considered 
restricted free agents (Jessop, 2012). Essentially, this restriction means that a player’s 
current team has first mover advantage in offering a long-term contract.  
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Agents have little room to negotiate rookie contracts as they adhere to a strict 
salary scale. Compensation is dictated by the position a player is selected in the draft. 
However, under the current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) rookie salaries can 
fall within 80-120% of what the scale dictates. Typically, players selected in the first 
round (certainly within the lottery) command the 20% premium (Jessop, 2012). 
Joshi Analysis 
  
 Nikhil Joshi, during his time at Stanford University, conducted research to 
determine whether top draft picks were overpaid compared to players drafted later. He 
concluded that rookies are roughly paid one quarter of what they would be worth in an 
open free-agent market. While not beneficial to the player, it does open the opportunity 
for NBA organizations to maximize production per payroll costs by performing well in 
the draft. Joshi attempts to capture marginal revenue per player to determine value, 
whereas this paper uses win shares that are dictated by actual in-game performance. 
Marginal revenue per player is a method that is widely used in the literature for 
comparing compensation, but it does not do a good job of determining when players are 
undervalued, which is why this paper chose to use win shares as its method of 
determining player value (Joshi, 2011).  
Scouting Dilemmas  
 
As has been discussed, the NBA draft is an opportunity for teams to add talent to 
their rosters without spending large amounts of capital. Due to the importance of this 
opportunity, NBA organizations place great emphasis on gauging the talent of incoming 
prospects through scouting. Yet, this method is not a perfect science.  
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One way NBA teams learn about incoming talent is through an organized event 
called the NBA Combine. This combine sheds light on a prospect’s ability by measuring 
certain factors that effect performance such as bench press, vertical jump, and three 
quarter court sprint time. Additionally, physical characteristics like height, weight, and 
wingspan are recorded during the combine (Wasserman, 2017). 
Teams also hire scouts to watch live and recorded performances of college and 
foreign prospects. Scouts usually come to a general consensus on players that will have 
the greatest impact in the NBA. However, this process has fallen victim to blatant misses 
over the years. Michael Jordan, considered to be one of the best players of all time, was 
drafted third overall in 1984 behind Hakeem Olajuwon and Sam Bowie. Olajuwon, 
although a two-time NBA champion, only found post-season success during the timespan 
that Jordan was away from basketball, pursuing baseball ambitions (Biography.com, 
2016). Bowie, considered one of the greatest draft busts in NBA history, never won an 
NBA championship (Schoenfield, 1996).  
A more recent and glaring example would be Draymond Green. Green is 
considered to be the prototypical “big-man” in the current small-ball era of the NBA. 
However, in 2012 Green fell to the 35th pick of the second round. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Draymond’s game transcended significantly from the end of his college 
career to 2015, when Green was a main contributor to the Golden State Warrior’s 
championship run. In hindsight, experts agree that the sole reason Green was not drafted 
higher was because scouts could not decide what position he was best suited for in the 
NBA (Titus, 2017). This scouting bias is the exact error that this research aims to help 
alleviate through analysis of advanced metrics.  
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Rating Agencies 
 
 Currently, rating agencies (as exist for high school prospects) are non-existent for 
college basketball players. Firms like 247, Scout and Rivals all have proprietary 
algorithms that attempt to measure high school prospect ability. For the NBA, media 
outlets like ESPN have analysts and senior writers that attempt to predict where a player 
will be drafted, but detailed analysis on a player’s ability is relatively non-existent 
(Nusser, 2013). This lack of information detracts from a perfect market existing for the 
NBA draft and is possibly a cause for the errors mentioned in the previous section. 
Interestingly, 247 even have a “Top247” for college football players but do not have 
similar analysis for basketball. This gap in the rating agency market could possibly be an 
opportunity for one of the top firms, or a new firm who addresses this unmet need.  
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Research Overview 
 
 The genesis of this research was the “Preliminary Draft Analysis” where the 
relationship between win-shares and draft position was examined. The “Preliminary Draft 
Analysis” included a data set of fourteen draft classes and was compiled using 
Basketball-Reference.com. The data set was expanded to include eighteen draft classes 
spanning 1989 to 2006 for the “Career Analysis”. This analysis took career data for 
multiple variables including compensation and ran regressions against win shares in the 
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attempt to find key drivers of individual win contribution. From this expanded data set a 
random sample of 35 players was taken to form a panel set. This “Panel Analysis” 
allowed for the examination of different variables’ effects on win shares over the course 
of a player’s career. From this analysis it became evident that the draft was of upmost 
importance, so all observations at the first, fifteenth, thirtieth, forty-fifth and sixtieth draft 
positions were taken from the master data set to examine the relationship between win 
share production over time at varying draft spots.  
Equations 
The Win Share Model 
 
 Mentioned previously in the “Sports-Reference Model” section, win share 
methodology was used for this research, in lieu of the Bill James model, due to the 
additional complexity that allows for negative wins and encompasses more statistics that 
are relevant to the game of basketball (NBA Win Shares).   
 To cover the Sports-Reference model in more detail, one must examine the two 
formulas that feed the final result: Offensive Win Shares (OWS) and Defensive Win 
Shares (DWS). OWS are calculated using Dean Oliver’s formulas for points produced 
and offensive possessions. All of the following formulas can be found in the Sports-
Reference Glossary (Basketball-Reference.com). The step-by-step method is outlined 
below: 
1) Calculate “Points Produced” for each player using Dean Oliver’s formula: 
a) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 =𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝐺 +  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴 𝑇 + 𝐹𝑇𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑒 × 1− !"#$%&&'(!"#$%&'()*+,'-- ×𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑅𝐵𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡× 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦%)+ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑅𝐵 
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2) Calculate “Offensive Possessions” for each player using Dean Oliver’s formula:  
a) 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝐹𝐺×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝑇×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 
3) Calculate “Marginal Offense” for each player:  
a) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑓𝑓 =𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 − 0.92×(𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛)×(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠) 
4) Calculate “Marginal Points per Win” for each player. 
a) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛 = 0.32×(𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒)×( !"#$%#&"!"#$%"&#'") 
i) Where 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑒 = 48×(!"#$%&''!!""#$%%!× !"#$%&'()#*"+! ) 
5) Calculate “OWS” for each player: 
a) 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑊𝑆 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑓𝑓/𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛 
Next, DWS must be calculated and added, as the sum of OWS and DWS results in the 
win share total for each player. This method is based partially on Dean Oliver’s 
“Defensive Rating” statistic, which is an estimate of a player’s points allowed per 100 
defensive possessions. The step-by-step method is outlined below:  
1) Calculate the “Defensive Rating” for each player using Dean Oliver’s formula: 
a) 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑡𝑔 = 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑡𝑔 + 0.2×(100×𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠× 1−𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝% − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑡𝑔) 
2) Calculate “Marginal Defense” for each player: 
a) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑓 =
!"#$%&'()!"#$%*!"#$%&'()#*"+ ×𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠× 1.08×𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠 − (!"#$%&!"" ) 
3) Calculate “Marginal Points per Win” for each player: 
a) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛 = 0.32×𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒×( !"#$%#&"!"#$!"#$%") 
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4) Calculate “DWS” for each player: 
a) 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑊𝑆 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑓/𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛 
The sum of OWS and DWS can then be calculated to arrive at a win share total 
for the respective player in question for any particular season.  
WS/Season per Million Dollars 
 
Wins-per-Million Dollars is an essential formula to this paper because it allows 
one to analyze the relationship between individual player contribution and compensation. 
As was stated in the “Basis of Research”, one goal of this paper is to identify players with 
high win-contribution levels with minimal payroll burdens. To compute, the win shares 
produced for a specific time period is divided by the compensation accrued over the same 
time period, and then multiplied by one million. This equation is unique to this paper and 
is an extension of the formula list provided above. 
!"!"#$%& 𝑝𝑒𝑟$1𝑀 =𝑊𝑆/𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛×$1𝑀 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Career Analysis 
 
 
Description of Purpose 
 
 The overarching goal of this paper was to create a risk/reward methodology that 
aided NBA franchises in making rookie contract decisions. The first step in achieving the 
stated goal was to identify the types of players who historically have been high win share 
(1)	
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contributors and determine whether there are shared characteristics between them. The 
career analysis set out to determine key drivers of win shares by examining multiple 
variables’ effect on player win-contribution, using career data. By expanding the 
variables from solely focusing on draft position, this step expanded the scope of the 
research and broadened its implications.  
Data Summary 
 
 The data set for players drafted in the NBA between 1989 and 2006 originally 
consisted of 1,022 individuals. However, for the purposes of this research, the data set 
was parsed to 674 individuals who had at least played 82 games. This was done because 
when examining win shares over a specific period of time, such as wins per season or 
wins per 48 minutes, players who have only played a limited amount of games can skew 
the statistic. Using this method, only players who had played an equivalent of one season 
were included in the analysis. Of the 674 players, there were 120 point guards, 131 
shooting guards, 130 small forwards, 138 power forwards and 153 centers.  
Figure 2 - Career Analysis Data Set by Position 
By Position 
PG 17.8% 
SG 19.4% 
SF 19.3% 
PF 20.5% 
C 22.7% 
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The following figure outlines the definitions for the variables gathered for the 
career analysis.  
 
Figure 3 - Career Analysis Variable Descriptions 
Variable Descriptions 
Name Description 
FG% Field goal percentage for a player’s career.  
FT% Free throw percentage for a player’s career. 
MPG Average minutes played per game during a player’s career. 
PPG Average points per game during a player’s career. 
TRB  Average total rebounds per game during a player’s career. 
AST  Average assists per game during a player’s career. 
Win Shares Win shares accumulated over a player’s career. 
Salary Dollars accumulated over a player’s career. 
Pick Position a player was selected in the draft. 
 
The summary of the statistics gathered for the career analysis is listed below.   
Figure 4 - Career Analysis Data Set Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics 
 
Max Mean Median Min StDev 
FG% 61.60% 44.70% 44.10% 30.30% 4.51% 
FT% 91.00% 72.72% 73.90% 44.50% 8.92% 
MPG 41.10 21.23 20.70 5.10 7.80 
PPG 27.10 8.41 7.40 1.40 4.66 
TRB 12.70 3.70 3.20 0.50 2.06 
AST 9.90 1.80 1.30 - 1.56 
WS 206.4 28.56246291 17.95 -1.6 33.40109394 
Salary $389,250,042.60 $50,758,386.47 $29,714,351.40 $353,592.52 $58,005,977.30 
Pick 23.68 22.67 22.31 22.01 21.74 
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Regression Models 
Salary on Win Shares 
Results 
 𝑊𝑆 = 𝐵! + 𝐵!×𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 
 
 By running a regression of salary’s effect on win shares, one can see in Figure 6 
that 82.40% of the variation in win shares is accounted for by salary. The model as a 
whole is significant with an F-statistic result of 3,146.15. Additionally, salary is 
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 56.09 and a p-value of 0. The relationship 
between salary and win shares indicates that players who are paid more produce more 
win shares for their respective organizations.  
Figure 5 - Salary on Win Shares Results 
Observations 674 
F (1, 672) 3146.15 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
82.40% 
 
WS Coefficient Std. Error t  P>(t) 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Salary 5.23E-07 9.32E-09 56.09 0 5.04E-07 5.41E-07 
Constant 2.03 0.72 2.83 0.005 0.62 3.44 
Findings 
 
 It seems there is a positive linear relationship between salary and win shares. The 
following figure displays this relationship, however the majority of the observations are 
located in the bottom left corner of the chart. This depiction shows that there is a talent 
scarcity issue in the NBA, especially considering this data set includes player career 
history from eighteen draft classes. The goal of drafting players and making sound team 
option decisions then becomes more important, so that organizations can avoid capital 
intensive processes of acquiring players through trades and free agency.  
(2)	
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Figure 6 - Salary & Win Share Relationship 
 
Game Play on Win Shares 
Results 
 𝑊𝑆 = 𝐵! + 𝐵!×𝐹𝐺%+ 𝐵!×𝐹𝑇%+ 𝐵!×𝑃𝑃𝐺 + 𝐵!×𝑇𝑅𝐵 + 𝐵!×𝐴𝑆𝑇 + 𝐵!×𝑀𝑃 
  
 Game play statistics were gathered for the analysis to determine if it is possible to 
predict win-shares based on in game performance. This regression shows that the game 
play statistics measured account for 72.08% of the variation in win shares. All of the 
variables were statistically significant with large t-statistics and low p-values all below 
0.01. Therefore, it is plausible to say that win shares can be predicted based on the game 
play statistics, which provide insight on in-game performance. This makes sense because 
the win share statistic is calculated using game play statistics. Although the win share 
statistic at the base level is a combination of various advanced metrics, those advanced 
metrics are composed of underlying game play statistics.  
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Figure 7 - Game Play on Win Shares Results 
 
Observations 674 
F (6, 667) 286.93 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
72.08% 
 
WS Coefficient Std. Error t  P>(t) 95% Confidence Interval 
FG% 52.54 19.42 2.71 0.007 14.41 90.67 
FT% 37.33 9.99 3.74 0 17.71 56.95 
PPG 3.41 0.38 8.9 0 2.66 4.16 
TRB 7.31 0.65 11.26 0 6.04 8.59 
AST 7.5 0.73 10.28 0 6.06 8.93 
MP -0.92 0.28 -3.28 0.001 -1.47 -0.37 
Constant -71.78 11.71 -6.13 0 -94.78 -48.78 
Career Analysis Discussion 
 
The following figure reinforces the idea that high win share producers are a rare 
commodity, as the large majority of observations produce close to zero win shares.  
Figure 8 - Win Share Distribution 
 
 Examining win shares at a career level is important because it allows the 
completion of two goal-necessary steps outlined in the “Basis of Research” : 1) High win 
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share producers demand higher salaries 2) Win share production levels can be predicted 
by game play statistics. However, NBA organizations form contracts with players that are 
time bound. Additionally, said organizations compete to win championships on a year-
by-year basis. Therefore, it is important to understand the dynamics of how win share 
production levels fluctuate over the course of a player’s career. To examine this, panel 
data is necessary. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE  
 
Initial Random Sample Analysis 
 
 
Description of Purpose 
 
Of the master data set, thirty-five players were randomly selected, representing 
approximately 5% of the original sample. Seasonal data was collected for these players, 
creating a panel data set. This panel data set was created to examine the impact of given 
variables on win shares over the course of a player’s career. The master data set 
essentially gives insight to the question: What do high win share producers look like? 
While the panel data set attempts to answer: When can teams get a good deal on a high 
win share producer?  
Data Summary 
 
 The variables collected for the random sample analysis are described below. One 
observation is equivalent to one year of data for a given player. Therefore, TRB through 
PTS are variables that count totals during a given year, as opposed to per-game statistics 
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that are commonly used when analyzing NBA players. The decision to use season totals 
instead of seasonal per-game averages was largely made to match the data collected for 
college players.  
Figure 9 - Panel Analysis Variable Descriptions 
Variable Descriptions 
Name Description 
ID The numerical identifier associated with a player’s data  
Time The year of the observation. For example, “1” would indicate a player’s rookie year 
FG% Field goal percentage for a given observation 
TRB Total rebounds for a given observation 
AST Total assists for a given observation 
STL Total steals for a given observation 
BLK Total blocks for a given observation 
TOV Total turnovers for a given observation 
PF Total personal fouls for a given observation 
PTS Total points for a given observation 
Salary Salary for a given observation 
WS/Season Win shares for a given observation 
 
 The summary of the panel data set is outlined below. As is expected from a 
random sample, there is wide variation in virtually all of the variables seen through the 
respective standard deviations.  
Figure 10 - Panel Analysis Data Summary 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ID 18.14 10.21 1 35 
Time 5.64 3.54 1 16 
FG% 0.45 0.06 0.25 1 
TRB 256.64 203.53 0 904 
AST 96.15 94.91 0 619 
STL 43.38 34.64 0 197 
BLK 29.68 33.58 0 215 
TOV 77.99 59.45 0 315 
PF 129.52 76.91 0 371 
PTS 548.63 414.63 2 1686 
Salary 2.67 2.74 -0.8 12.7 
WS/Season 4,495,457 4,478,880 224,018 22,800,000 
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WS/Season per $1 Million  
 
 The figure below shows the average of win shares divided by salary, multiplied 
by one million, for the entirety of the panel data set. Titled “Wins per $1 million” the 
chart shows how many wins (Y-Axis) a player will, on average, contribute per $1 million 
they receive in compensation over time (X-Axis). Essentially, players with high “Wins 
per $1 million” statistics contribute more wins for lower cost than players with low 
statistics. Interestingly, the chart peaks at year three. This finding indicates that players 
contribute most, relative to their compensation, in the third year of their NBA career. 
Rookie contracts include a team option for the third year, so players that have this option 
exercised, on average, deliver more value than players not bound by a rookie contract 
extension. This relationship is seen in the decline after the third year. Teams do have a 
fourth year option with rookie contracts, so it is interesting not to see the peak in year 
four.  
 The line roughly bottoms out between years eight and nine. To note, there is 
possible survivorship bias to explain the spikes in later years, as the players who had 
longer careers tended to be perennial all-stars.  
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Figure 11 – WS/Season per $1 million 
 
 The following figure displays the information presented above, but by position for 
the first five years. It is clear that the gap between production and compensation begins to 
close after year three, since by year five all rookies are either no longer in the NBA or 
have signed long term contracts. The only position to not follow the trend is power 
forward, as the average of WS/Season per $1 million for power forwards in the random 
sample increases in year five. However, the N size for power forwards is only nine and 
by year five only four players remained in the NBA. Therefore, the high win share 
production of former perennial all-star Shawn Kemp influences the attribution. In fact, 
Kemp contributed over seven win shares in year five, while the remaining three power 
forwards did not even have one win share. 
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Figure 12 - Random Panel WS/Season per $1M by Position 
 
Initial Random Sample Discussion 
 
 The initial analysis of the panel data sought to answer: When can teams get a 
good deal on a high win share producer? Realizing players contribute the most win shares 
for the lowest cost in the option years of their rookie contracts, NBA organizations 
should try hardest to identify high win share producers before they enter the NBA. 
Acquiring talent early in their career post-draft is difficult due to the low risk NBA teams 
exert by taking on a player with minimal costs for two years. The following section 
outlines two analyses that examine how draft position affects win shares over an entire 
career and how differences in draft position affect win shares at varying career intervals.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Draft Analysis 
 
 
Summary 
 
 As shown through the “Initial Random Sample Analysis” players are most 
valuable in terms of win production levels in the team option years (three and four) of 
their rookie contracts. By selecting players in the draft who are predicted to be high win 
share producers, teams have the potential of high production for low cost in years three 
and four. This potential comes at a low risk as teams can discard of underperforming 
players after year two.  
Preliminary Draft Analysis  
Description of Purpose 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the relationship between draft 
position and career win shares and show whether or not players drafted earlier contribute 
more wins over their respective careers.  
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Data Summary 
 
The variables collected for this data set are defined below:  
 
Figure 13 - Preliminary Draft Analysis Variable Description 
Variable Descriptions 
Name Description 
Pick Draft position in which a player was selected 
PickSq Draft position squared 
Avg. Salary The quotient of career compensation and years played 
Career Length Number of years played in a career 
Games Number of games played in a career 
Avg. Games The quotient of number of games played and number of years played 
Minutes Number of minutes played in a career 
Avg. Minutes The quotient of number of minutes played and number of games played 
WinShares The number of wins attributed to a single player in a career  
WinShares/48 The number of wins attributed to a single player per 48 minutes played 
College Dummy variable indicating whether or not a player went to college 
Foreign Dummy variable indicating whether or not a player originated from a foreign country 
 
This data set features data from Basketball-Reference.com, including all players 
drafted from 1989 to 2002. Some observations are missing data for certain variables, such 
as “Games” and “WinShares”, as some players who are drafted do not play a complete 
season in the NBA (if at all). Therefore, the regression ran using this data set only had 
625 observations, as opposed to the total 728 observations.  
Figure 14 - Preliminary Draft Analysis Data Summary 
 
 		
Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Pick 728 29 16 1 58 
Avg Salary 728 2970386 3540878 0 2.02E+07 
Career Length 625 8 5 1 21 
Games 625 427 363 1 1462 
Avg Games 728 40 24 0 78.53 
Minutes 624 10697 11686 3 50418 
Avg Minutes 626 18.32 9.08 0 41.1 
WinShares 625 22.49 32.7 -1.6 206.4 
College  728 0.91 0.28 0 1 
Foreign 728 0.07 0.26 0 1 
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Regression Model: Pick on Win Shares 
 
Results 
 𝑊𝑆 =  𝐵! + 𝐵!×𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑘 + 𝐵!×𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑘! 
 
The figure below highlights the polynomial relationship between “Pick” and 
“WinShares”, which provided the justification for including the “PickSq” variable. 
Figure 15 - Win Shares & Pick Relationship 
 
 
Figure 16 - Pick on Win Share Results 
Observations 625 
F (2, 622) 126.06 
Prob > F 0 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
28.61% 
 
 WS  Coefficient Std Error t P>|t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Pick -2.994 0.274 -10.92 0 -3.533 -2.456 
PickSq 0.037 0.005 7.52 0 0.0269 0.0461 
Constant 66.62 3.25 20.49 0 60.235 73.006 
 
  
(4)	
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This regression analyzes the relationship between draft position and career win-
shares. The model as a whole is significant due to the F-statistic of 126.06. All variables 
are statistically significant and “Pick” seems to be practically significant because a one-
unit increase in draft numerical value results in three less wins contributed by the player. 
For example, the model suggests a player selected first would contribute almost 64 wins 
throughout his career, while the player selected last overall would only contribute 
roughly 17 wins. The R-Squared for this model is 28.84%, indicating that the position a 
player is selected does not account for the entire variation in win shares. Despite the low 
R-Squared figure, the model still provides important insight on the relationship. 
Findings 
 
The figure below depicts the percentage of players for a specific draft position 
(over the 14 drafts in which data was collected) who contributed more wins than the 
regression model predicted. Outperformance was determined by examining the residuals 
of the regression analysis. Picks one through five outperformed the model at least 50% of 
the time, while the only other lottery pick to post similar outperformance was pick 13. 
However, when put into the perspective of the entire draft, picks 21 and 37 were the only 
picks outside the lottery to outperform the model at least 50% of the time. Therefore, 
75% of the draft positions that had a majority of players outperform their predicted win 
share totals were within the draft lottery, giving credence to the lottery itself.  
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Figure 17 - Pick on Win Shares Residuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draft Position Analysis 
Description of Purpose 
  
 Knowing that players are paid least for production in the early years of their 
career, and that teams subsequently must draft well, this analysis seeks to examine 
whether a relationship exists between where a player is drafted and the win shares they 
produce over the course of their career. The dataset for this analysis is a subset of the 
dataset collected for the “Career Analysis”, using all first, fifteenth, thirtieth, forty-fifth 
and sixtieth draft selections made over the course of the eighteen drafts from 1989 to 
2006. However, this dataset was converted from career data to season-by-season data for 
win share and salary statistics to create a panel data set.  
 
 
Percent of Picks with Higher Win Shares vs. Model Prediction 
Pick 1 54% Pick 15 38% Pick 30 46% Pick 45 23% 
Pick 2 62% Pick 16 46% Pick 31 15% Pick 46 15% 
Pick 3 54% Pick 17 46% Pick 32 23% Pick 47 38% 
Pick 4 54% Pick 18 31% Pick 33 15% Pick 48 23% 
Pick 5 54% Pick 19 31% Pick 34 23% Pick 49 15% 
Pick 6 15% Pick 20 23% Pick 35 15% Pick 50 0% 
Pick 7 15% Pick 21 69% Pick 36 8% Pick 51 8% 
Pick 8 31% Pick 22 23% Pick 37 54% Pick 52 15% 
Pick 9 38% Pick 23 46% Pick 38 23% Pick 53 8% 
Pick 10 46% Pick 24 38% Pick 39 23% Pick 54 15% 
Pick 11 38% Pick 25 23% Pick 40 23% Pick 55 0% 
Pick 12 8% Pick 26 31% Pick 41 31% Pick 56 0% 
Pick 13 62% Pick 27 31% Pick 42 15% Pick 57 14% 
Pick 14 23% Pick 28 38% Pick 43 46% Pick 58 0% 
    Pick 29 31% Pick 44 15%     
	 34	
Data Summary 
 
 The descriptions of the variables are listed below. Important to note is the “Last” 
variable, which signifies players drafted last in their respective draft. The last pick 
number varied throughout the data collected from 1989 to 2006 due to NBA expansion.  
Figure 18 - Draft Position Variable Descriptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The summary of the data is shown below. There seems to be great variation in 
win shares among observations. Also, as a consequence of later draft picks being more 
likely to not have an NBA career (or shorter careers in general), the dataset was skewed 
toward earlier picks in terms of observations.  
Figure 19 - Draft Position Data Summary 
Variable Descriptions 
Name Description 
Time Describes the season of a player’s career (1 represents a rookie season) 
WS/Season Describes the win shares produced per season 
Salary/Season Describes compensation per season 
First Describes players drafted first overall 
Fifteenth Describes players drafted in the fifteenth position 
Thirtieth Describes players drafted in the thirtieth position 
Forty-Fifth Describes players drafted in the forty-fifth position 
Last Describes players drafted last overall 
Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Time 625 6.48 4.15 1 19 
Pick 625 18.56 17.94 1 60 
WS/Season 625 3.95 4.03 -1.2 20.3 
Salary/Season 625 7,112,345 7,070,432 28,751.5 40,300,000 
First 625 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Fiftienth 625 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Thirtieth 625 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Forty-Fifth 625 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Last 625 0.04 0.20 0 1 
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Regression Model: Draft Position on WS/Season 
 
A panel regression was run for this analysis, setting Player ID (a numerical value 
assigned to each player for identification, not analysis, purposes) and Time for the panel. 
A fixed effect was not used due to dummy variables being created manually for the pick 
groups.  The first overall picks were left out of the regression to be used as the 
comparison group.  
Results 
 𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛 =  𝐵! + 𝐵!×𝐹𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝐵!×𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑡ℎ + 𝐵!×𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑦 − 𝐹𝑖𝑓𝑡ℎ+ 𝐵!×𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 
 
 The figure below displays the results from the draft position regression. While the 
r-squared value is low, with only 16.33% of the variation in win shares explained by the 
draft groups, it is important to note that all of the variables were extremely statistically 
and practically significant. Interestingly, the coefficients on the “Fifteenth”, “Thirtieth 
and “Forty-Fifth” variables are all relatively similar. Therefore a player drafted 15th, 30th 
or 45th in the draft should perform similarly to one another compared to players drafted 
first overall, ceteris paribus. The average for WS/Season in the dataset was 3.95. Using 
the regression model, it is impossible to arrive at a WS/Season statistic equal to, or above, 
the average. With the mean win shares for first overall picks at 5.92, it is clear that the 
comparison group skewed the overall dataset.  
 
 
 
(5)	
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Figure 20 - Draft Position Regression Results 
 
Observations 625 
Groups 79 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
16.33% 
 
 WS/Season  Coefficient Std Error z P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Fifteenth -3.40 0.69 -4.91 0.00 -4.76 -2.04 
Thirtieth -3.62 0.72 -5.04 0.00 -5.03 -2.21 
Forty-Fifth -3.63 0.74 -4.91 0.00 -5.08 -2.18 
Last -4.87 1.06 -4.60 0.00 -6.94 -2.80 
Constant 5.63 0.47 12.05 0.00 4.71 6.54 
Findings 
 
 The regression may not have shown that draft position is a large determinant of 
win shares, however it does lend credence to the findings of the “Preliminary Draft 
Analysis”. That model showed that outside the first few picks, there are relatively few 
positions that outperform predicted win share levels historically. This model shows that 
there is relative parity among all of the draft groups except the “Last” group when 
comparing performance to first overall picks. Essentially, this means that high win share 
producers are most likely found at the top of the draft, but can be found throughout the 
draft and picks outside the lottery are all roughly similar in value. Do NBA teams 
currently act accordingly to the results of this regression? It is hard to say with certainty, 
as historical draft moves are not formally documented. However, in the 2017 draft there 
were six moves made to either buy into or shift position in the second round (NBA.com, 
2017). This activity runs contrast to the data provided above, as picks outside the first 
fourteen are relatively equal. 
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Draft Discussion 
 
 The “Initial Random Sample Analysis” provided evidence that players produce 
more win shares per million dollars during the early years of their career. The way teams 
acquire rookies is through the draft. Hence, a logical follow up question is: Where are 
high win share producers historically selected in the draft? The “Preliminary Draft 
Analysis” displayed that, outside the first five selections, players drafted at nearly all 
other draft positions did not outperform the model in terms of win shares historically. 
Therefore, the model seems to show that the first five draft picks are positions where high 
win share producers have been selected historically.  
Additionally, the “Draft Position Analysis” provided evidence that first overall 
picks, when compared to the remaining draft groups, do produce more win shares. 
However, the middle three draft groups (15th, 30th and 45th) perform similarly when 
compared to first overall picks, meaning that if teams do not secure a lottery pick, it is not 
essential to “move up” in the draft and forfeit assets like veterans or future draft picks. 
While teams are greatly benefited by superstar players that contribute outlier win share 
statistics, it is also necessary for teams to round out rosters with players who routinely 
provide positive win shares.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
Secondary Random Sample Analysis  
 
 
Description of Purpose 
  
 The “Draft Analysis” showed that high win share producers are historically 
selected earlier in the draft, however teams do not perennially have a top five or even top 
fifteen pick. Therefore, it is important to understand how to make sound draft selections 
with later picks. To accomplish the stated task, it is important to understand how to 
predict player win production levels using only data available during a player’s collegiate 
career. Additionally, once a player is drafted, determining whether to exercise team 
options in years three and four is essential to the talent management process of NBA 
organizations. Using the random sample described in the “Initial Random Sample 
Analysis” three regressions were executed to accomplish the aforementioned goals.  
Regression Models 
Panel Data Regression 
  
The random sample was used in its entirety for the panel regression. This 
regression was run to show whether or not in-game statistics are sound predictors of win 
shares per season when analyzed on a season-by-season basis. The variable descriptions 
and data summary for this regression can be found within the “Initial Random Sample 
Analysis” section of this paper. A fixed effects panel regression was run for this analysis, 
setting player id and time for the panel.  
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Results 
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 The variables selected account for 73.76% of win shares per season.  All of the 
variables are statistically significant with large t values and P values of zero or near zero. 
The most practically significant variable is FG% because a one percentage point increase 
in FG% yields 5.404 more win shares per season holding all else constant. This finding 
lends to the idea that efficient players have higher win shares, due to the minimization of 
activities that are detrimental to their teams, such as missing attempted shots.  
Figure 21 – Panel Regression Results 
Observations 292 
Groups 35 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
73.76% 
 
WS/Season Coefficient Std. Error t P>(t) 95% Confidence Interval 
FG% 5.006 1.261 3.97 0.000 2.5218 7.4900 
TRB  0.003 0.001 2.63 0.009 0.0007 0.0049 
AST 0.005 0.002 2.61 0.010 0.0013 0.0096 
STL 0.012 0.006 1.94 0.053 -0.0002 0.0240 
BLK 0.012 0.004 2.77 0.006 0.0034 0.0204 
TOV -0.016 0.005 -3.50 0.001 -0.0255 -0.0071 
PF -0.008 0.002 -3.12 0.002 -0.0125 -0.0028 
PTS 0.005 0.001 7.15 0.000 0.0036 0.0064 
Constant -2.163 0.549 -3.94 0.000 -3.2436 -1.0825 
Findings 
 
This model is a better representation of the relationship between in-game statistics 
and win shares than “Game Play on Win Shares” displayed in the career analysis, 
although it reaffirms the findings. Intuitively, because the win share statistic is built off of 
(6)	
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in-game statistics, it makes sense that in-game statistics would be good predictors of win 
production levels.   
College Data Regression 
 
 For the college data regression, only the last year of college data prior to a player 
entering the NBA draft was used. Additionally, the win shares per season for the rookie 
year observations were used as the Y variable, to determine whether or not college in-
game statistics can determine rookie production levels. This regression is significant 
because NBA organizations must draft well to maximize production compared to cost of 
roster talent as seen in the “WS/Season per $1 Million” analysis.  
Data Summary 
 
 Of the thirty-five players included in the panel regression, only thirty-three 
players were used in this model, as two of the observations did not attend college. Since 
this model includes two fewer observations, an additional data summary is provided 
below for accuracy. All variable descriptions remain the same from those assigned in the 
“Initial Random Sample Analysis”. “TOV” and “PF” were not included in the model for 
college data as many players were missing this information, indicating that turnovers and 
personal fouls are statistics that have not been tracked in college basketball until recently.  
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Figure 22 - College Data Summary 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FG 0.4936 0.0493 0.42 0.65 
TRB 219.85 73.57 78 352 
AST 82.18 64.11 9 299 
STL 44.06 27.08 5 111 
BLK 33.88 34.27 0 156 
PTS 567.82 145.52 135 818 
WS/Season Rookie 0.88 1.22 -0.50 4.60 
Results 
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The regression results below indicate that college in-game statistics do not 
account for any of the variation in rookie win shares when viewing adjusted r-squared. 
None of the variables were statistically or practically significant. 
Figure 23 - College Data Regression Results 
Observations 33 
F (9, 23) 0.34 
Adj. R-Squared -14.22% 
 
WS/Season Rookie Coefficient Std. Err. t  P>(t) 95% Confidence Interval 
FG 0.609 5.524 0.11 0.913 -10.75 11.96 
TRB -0.003 0.005 -0.70 0.488 -0.01 0.01 
AST 0.003 0.006 0.49 0.630 -0.01 0.02 
STL -0.017 0.015 -1.12 0.273 -0.05 0.01 
BLK 0.005 0.009 0.60 0.553 -0.01 0.02 
PTS 0.001 0.002 0.41 0.687 0.00 0.01 
Constant 1.150 2.772 0.4 0.682 -4.55 6.85 
 
Findings 
 
 Although the regression did not yield significant results, the model shows that in-
game statistics for the last year of collegiate play are not a sound indicator of rookie win 
share totals. Examining more than one year of collegiate play could be beneficial, 
(7)	
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however a large share of drafted players only play one year of college basketball. This 
model does not factor in the conference a college player was in, nor their team’s strength 
of schedule, as Alexander Greene did in his model. These two data points are important, 
as there is disparity among conferences and schedules in college basketball. While 
Greene’s model aimed to look at different relationships, including more qualitative data 
for the college observations may improve this model. Understanding that drafting well is 
important in taking advantage of the most productive years of a player’s career in terms 
of wins per million dollars, it seems NBA organizations must find other ways of 
determining rookie win share totals from data available for collegiate athletes.  
Despite the shortcomings of this model, examining whether third year win shares 
can be determined by data available for rookies is still mission critical. The following 
model seeks to answer this, moving closer toward the overarching goal of the paper, 
which is to determine whether NBA organizations can make better decisions regarding 
rookie contracts in option years by analyzing win shares.   
Rookie Data Regression 
 
 For the rookie data regression, only the year one observations for each player in 
the random sample were used. Additionally, the win shares for third year observations 
were used as the Y variable, to determine whether or not rookie in-game statistics can 
determine third year production levels. This regression is significant because NBA 
organizations must make decisions regarding third year team options for rookies before 
the start of the second season. Therefore, teams are making these decisions based solely 
on rookie data.  
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Data Summary 
 
 Of the thirty-five players selected for the random sample, only thirty-three played 
three or more seasons and therefore only thirty-three observations are found in this 
regression. Since the observations for this regression were altered from the original 
model, a new data summary was generated for accuracy. The variable names all remain 
valid from the “Initial Random Sample Analysis”. 
Figure 24 - Rookie Data Summary 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FG 0.4361 0.0597 0.29 0.57 
TRB 160.94 135.48 4 391 
AST 50.58 52.21 3 205 
STL 25.45 20.69 0 78 
BLK 24.94 38.09 0 163 
TOV 56.45 46.31 2 163 
PF 98.97 76.96 0 230 
PTS 330.91 292.01 23 1142 
WS/Season Rookie 0.911 1.237 -0.50 4.60 
WS/Season Year 3 2.855 2.874 -0.30 11.30 
Salary (Rookie) 1,837,976 1,028,515 507,239.30 4,759,380 
Results 
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 As seen in the figure below, the variables used in the regression account for 
45.20% of the variation in win shares per season. Therefore, rookie data only accounts 
for roughly 30% of win shares produced in a player’s third season. The R-Squared for 
this regression was 62.33% so it seems the regression is being penalized for including too 
many variables.  
(8)	
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“FG” seems to be practically significant but not statistically significant, as the t-
statistic and p-value are not significant, but an increase of one percentage point in field 
goal percentage in a player’s rookie season yields 6.92 more win shares in a player’s third 
season. Interestingly, “PF” seems to be statistically significant, alluding to the fact that 
players who commit less personal fouls in their rookie season produce more win shares in 
their third season. In fact, the variable seems to hold practical significance, as the mean in 
the data summary is 98 personal fouls. The average personal foul total would yield 3.64 
win shares less in a player’s third season, which is greater than the standard deviation for 
win shares. “PTS” is statistically significant but not practically significant, as the 
coefficient is negative. Since the team with more points wins, it is unrealistic that scoring 
more points in a rookie season would result in less win shares in a third season. A 
possible explanation to this result is that players who excel in their rookie season are 
defended with more urgency in subsequent seasons. “WS/Season Rookie” seems to be 
statistically significant with a t-statistic above two and a p value near zero. The variable 
also seems to be practically significant as one additional win share in a player’s rookie 
season produces roughly 1.5 more win shares in a player’s third season holding all else 
constant.  
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Figure 25 - Rookie Data Regression Results 
Observations 33 
F (9, 23) 3.64 
Adj. R-Squared 45.20% 
 
WS/Season Year 3 Coefficient Std. Err. t  P>(t) 95% Confidence Interval 
FG 6.92477 7.881 0.88 0.389 -9.420 23.269 
TRB 0.00057 0.012 0.05 0,964 -0.026 0.027 
AST -0.00062 0.022 -0.03 0.978 -0.047 0.046 
STL 0.03929 0.057 0.68 0.501 -0.080 0.159 
BLK 0.00773 0.017 0.46 0.652 -0.027 0.043 
TOV 0.09750 0.053 1.82 0.082 -0.014 0.209 
PF -0.03710 0.014 -2.58 0.017 -0.067 -0.007 
PTS -0.01226 0.006 -2.00 0.058 -0.025 0.000 
WS/Season Rookie 1.48867 0.549 2.71 0.013 0.350 2.628 
Salary (Rookie) 1.06E-06 5.59E-07 1.90 0.071 -9.79E-08 2.22E-06 
Constant -2.07071 3.427 -0.60 0.552 -9.179 5.037 
Findings 
 
 The regression may not account for all the variation in year three win shares, but 
it does yield interesting results. Needing an F statistic of 2.32 to be significant, the result 
of 3.64 shows that the overall model is statistically significant. “WS/Season Rookie” was 
both statistically and practically significant showing that win shares produced in a 
player’s rookie season are a good indicator of year three win shares. Additionally, “PF” 
was both statistically and practically significant and was negative, alluding to an inverse 
relationship between rookie personal fouls and year three win shares. This relationship 
makes sense and its significance shows that teams should observe how controlled a 
player is on the court. However, this regression is not a perfect model. The model does 
not account for all of the variation in year three. One reason could be win shares are the 
learning curve between college and the professional level. Players who do not perform 
well in their rookie season could excel by year three. Those who outperform in their 
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rookie season may see opponents adjust and face increased competition by their third 
year.  
 The figure below shows the relationship between rookies’ win-shares and win-
shares in year three.  
Figure 26 - WS/Season Rookie & WS/Season Year 3 Relationship 
 
Secondary Random Sample Discussion 
 
 It is evident through the results of the panel regression that in-game statistics 
correlate with win shares over the course of a player’s career. However, using the same 
statistics from college do not seem to show the same relationship with win shares for 
players during their rookie season. Interestingly, using the same in-game statistics with 
the addition of rookie win shares and rookie salary seem to give some indication of year 
three win shares. The last point is of most importance to this paper, as the relationship 
between in-game statistics and year three win shares show that NBA organizations can 
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make better judgments about the team options in rookie contracts by examining similar 
data.  
 By incorporating win shares per one million dollars analysis, teams can then 
determine whether a player is contributing production that exceeds their cost. While 
teams do not have much leeway in what a player’s third year salary is, due to rookie 
contract constraints, they do have flexibility in the qualifying offer extended after a 
player’s fourth year. Since the qualifying offer must be made before the beginning of the 
fourth year, teams must decide what the player is worth in terms of compensation after 
year three. Therefore, understanding the projection of a player’s development in terms of 
wins contributed through their first three years is vital in determining the dollar value to 
assign to a qualifying offer at the end of a player’s third year.  
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Conclusion & Further Research 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This paper finds that efficiency variables such as field goal percentage and proxy 
variables for self-control, like personal fouls, serve as sound predictors of future win 
share production. Through analysis of win shares versus compensation, it is found that 
players are typically paid in accordance to their production level, except when 
constrained by a rookie contract. Therefore, drafting seems to be a better solution than 
free agency or trades in locating high win share producers. Unfortunately, in-game 
statistics that serve as relatively good predictors of win share levels in the NBA are not 
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good predictors when collegiate data is used. However, analysis of the draft shows that 
high win share producers are typically found in earlier selections.  
Further Research 
 
 Further research could focus on finding a method to predict win shares for players 
entering the draft using data available on the collegiate level. Succeeding on this front 
would allow for perfect information in the draft market and eliminate errors like the 
Michael Jordan incident. NBA organizations are ultimately profit seeking firms and 
minimizing risks that result in sunk costs is highly beneficial. Additionally, further 
research could seek to examine adequate compensation levels for qualifying offers based 
on data available in the first three years of a player’s career. This analysis would show 
how NBA teams can take the team option analysis a step further and not overpay to keep 
talent, effectively eliminating the drop off in win shares per million dollars. Finally, from 
a different perspective, further research could take analysis from this paper relating to the 
disparity in production versus compensation under rookie contracts, along with the 
research in the “Joshi Analysis” to determine rational changes for the next collective 
bargaining agreement. It certainly is not in the best interest of players for this gap in 
production and compensation to exist, and therefore seems like an area for other 
researchers to examine. However, as long as this gap persists, NBA franchises should 
seek to exploit it to maximize seasonal wins and, in turn, attempts at championships as 
post season success seems to be the leading determinant in short and long term economic 
growth for organizations.  
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